Expert warns Chinese “hardliners” on the rise as Beijing floods East Asian waters with over 100 military vessels

A surge of Chinese naval activity in East Asian waters has analysts raising eyebrows, with some seeing signs that hardliners may be gaining the upper hand in Beijing. Last week, more than 100 ships from China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy and Coast Guard were spotted at sea—a show of force that experts suggest could be Beijing’s way of responding to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s firm stance against any use of force on Taiwan.

Shu Hsiao-huang, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, said the flotilla seems designed to send a clear message to the United States, Japan, and the Philippines, all of which have recently resisted Beijing’s regional ambitions. “China is signaling with warships instead of words,” Shu said. “It’s a display that’s loud, showy, and ultimately counterproductive.” He warned that Beijing’s aggressive posture could push neighboring countries further away while inadvertently strengthening political factions opposed to the Chinese government.

Still, Shu noted, there may be a domestic angle as well: the show of strength could be meant to reassure Chinese citizens that their leadership is projecting power and unity on the international stage.

Meanwhile, Lin Ying-yu, an associate professor at Tamkang University, pointed out that this recent naval activity differs from past exercises, like Joint Sword and Strait Thunderbolt. Unlike those large-scale drills, China’s air and missile forces were notably absent this time. Instead, Lin said, the operations seem to be a test of logistics, command, and control—key skills for managing large-scale deployments.

For now, the PLA appears content to simply flex its naval muscles, sending a clear signal across the first island chain in the Pacific without launching a full-scale exercise. Observers are watching closely to see if China’s aircraft carriers—the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian—will conduct simultaneous drills in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and western Pacific.

Experts caution that the focus shouldn’t just be on the number of ships or planes crossing the Taiwan Strait’s median line, but on the types of drills and the ongoing modernization of China’s armed forces. Lin said Beijing is likely to continue its “salami slice” strategy—gradually shrinking Taiwan’s buffer zones through targeted military exercises and incremental pressure.

As the pressures fester, China’s naval drills are more than just a show of supremacy and control. They expose how hard-hitting voices in Beijing are influencing and determining the nation’s tactical options—and suggest at the subtle balancing act confronting adjacent countries in a region where every vessel, every exercise, and every gesture matters.